an oil tanker accident will depend on the the strength of the tanker's hull and the vulnerability of fishing activity and tourism to a spill; and the expected harm from a crane accident will depend on characteristics of the crane and the exposure to risk of nearby buildings and passersby. I assume that it is impractical for the tax to be based on many such variables and for simplicity that the tax is a function only of an injurer's level of activity (amount of oil transported, number of uses of a crane). Hence, the tax will not induce injurers to choose their levels of activity optimally.
Under liability, an injurer who is sued is presumed to pay for the harm that occurs.
2 Thus, if suit for harm were always brought, an injurer's expected liability would equal expected harm, so that injurers would choose optimal levels of activity. Further, this would occur without the state needing information about the danger of activities; to impose liability requires only that the state determine the harm that eventuates (the state need not gauge the risk of an oil spill; it need only measure the harm from a spill that occurs). However, it is assumed that suit is not always brought, for harm may be hard to trace to its author and it may be too low to make suit worthwhile. Consequently, expected liability will be less than expected harm 3 and levels of activity will be excessive.
It follows that an assessment of the tax versus liability depends on a comparison of the inefficiency of the tax caused by variation in the danger of activities with the inefficiency of liability caused by escape from suit.
Joint use of taxation and liability is also considered. It is shown that liability should be imposed to the complete extent -injurers who are sued should pay for the entire harm -but, under a general condition, the tax should be less than expected harm.
In essence, liability should be employed fully because it creates a more efficient incentive than taxation; the tax should be used only to take up the slack due to the possibility that suit for harm would not be brought.
In the second version of the model, injurers are assumed to be identical in order to focus on another issue: injurers may choose not only a level of activity but also riskreducing actions, such as safety training of the crew of an oil tanker, the hiring of a pilot boat to accompany the tanker when entering or leaving port, or installation of a sonar system. The tax is presumed not to incorporate such precautions, for they may be costly to verify or be chosen after the tax is imposed. Thus, under the tax, no precautions will be taken in the model, making the risk per unit of activity inefficiently high. However, the level of activity will be correct given the excessive risk (the level of use of oil tankers will be appropriate given that they create an excessive danger of spills).
Under liability, in contrast, having to pay for harm creates incentives to choose positive precautions. But the possibility that suit would not be brought means that the level of precautions will be too low and the level of activity too high.
Hence, the comparison of taxes with liability depends on the tax-related problem of the absence of incentives to exercise precautions versus the liability-related problem of diluted incentives to exercise precautions and to moderate levels of activity due to escape from suit. Under optimal joint use of taxes and liability, liability is again employed to the full extent, and the tax equals only the fraction of expected harm that is unaccounted for by liability.
The conclusions from the model lead to two broad conjectures: First, in the general context of pollution of the atmosphere or large bodies of water, the tax may be superior to liability, for there may be relatively little variability among parties in expected harm per unit of pollutant discharged, whereas suit might not be likely, especially because of difficulty in proving the source of harm. But second, in most of the domain of negative externalities (exemplified by oil spills and crane accidents), liability may be superior to the tax, due to the significance of variability among parties in expected harm and of opportunities to take precautions.
I. Model with Expected Harm Varying Across Injurers
Let x Under a tax regime, an injurer who chooses activity level x pays tx in taxes, where t cannot depend on y, since as explained in the introduction the state is assumed to be unable to observe y. An injurer therefore selects x to maximize b(x) -tx regardless of his
y. Thus all injurers choose x*(t) and social welfare is
, where E(y) is the mean of y. Since b(x) -xE(y) is maximized at x*(E(y)), the optimal tax t* must be E(y) and social welfare is 
*(E(y)), which is not ideal; x*(E(y)) is too low for injurers with y < E(y) and excessive for injurers with y > E(y). Social welfare is W T .
Under a liability regime, an injurer who is sued pays for the harm caused. Hence, the state must be assumed to be able to verify the harm when accidents occur (which is not inconsistent with the assumption that the expected harm y is unobservable). Let p be the probability that suit for harm would be brought, where 0 < p < 1. Accordingly, an
injurer chooses x to maximize b(x) -pxy, so that x*(py) is selected. 4 Note that although x*(py) reflects y, it is excessive, x*(py) > x*(y) because p < 1. Social welfare is given by 
Accordingly, if enough probability mass is contained in this neighborhood, the tax will be superior to liability.
Assume now that both a tax t and liability are employed. To allow for the possibility of partial liability, let λ ≤ 1 be the fraction of harm that an injurer pays if found liable. Hence, an injurer chooses x to maximize b(x) -tx -λpxy, so that x is x*(t + λpy).
Social welfare is therefore W TL = ∫ 
PROPOSITION 4: Under the optimal joint tax and liability regime, liability is employed to the full extent -the fraction λ of harm paid by an injurer is 1. Also, the optimal tax t** is positive; and t** < t* = E(y) provided that injurer benefits b display decreasing absolute risk aversion.
The intuition supporting the first claim is that liability is a superior incentive to the tax because only under liability do expected payments reflect an individual injurer's expected harm y. To demonstrate the claim, assume first that t = 0. Then if λ < 1, x is x*(λpy) >
x*(py) > x*(y). From this and the concavity of b(x) -xy in x, we have b(x*(py)) -x*(py)y > b(x*(λpy)) -x*(λpy)y.
Hence, W TL is higher at λ = 1 than at λ < 1, showing the claim.
Next assume that t > 0 and let x(y) = x*(t + λpy). Note first that x(y) crosses x*(y)
once at y c = t/(1 -λp). In particular, at a crossing point, b′(x) = y = t + λpy, implying that y c is as stated. Now to show that λ = 1 is optimal, I demonstrate that if λ < 1, we can increase W TL by raising λ and lowering t. Specifically, raise λ by δ such that λ + δ < 1, and lower t by τ such that x(y) also crosses x*(y) at y c = t/(1 -λp), where x(y) = x*(t -τ + (λ + δ)py). This will be so if (t -τ) + (λ + δ)py c = y c , implying that τ = δpy c . By picking δ sufficiently small, we can guarantee that t -τ > 0. To prove that W TL will be higher, consider y < y c (an analogous argument applies for y > y c ). I claim that y < (t -τ) + (λ + δ)py < t + λpy. This inequality will establish that the integrand of W TL is higher for y < 
x*′(t + λpy)[b′(x*(t + λpy)) -y)]f(y)dy.
This is positive at t = 0 since x*′(λpy) < 0 and since b′(x*(λpy)) = λpy < y. Hence t** > 0.
The claim that t** < E(y) given decreasing absolute risk aversion of b is proved in the Online Appendix.
II. Model with Expected Harm a Function of Precautions
Now consider a modification of the foregoing model in which injurers are identical and the expected harm per unit of activity is y = y(e), where e is precautions to reduce the probability or magnitude of harm when engaging in an activity, and y is positive and decreasing and convex in e. Assume that social welfare is b(x) -(y(e) + e)x, benefits less the total expected harm and costs of precautions. It is clear that first-best precautions e* minimize y(e) + e, so e* is determined by y′(e) = -1. Hence, the ideal activity level x* maximizes b(x) -(y(e*) + e*)x, so x* is determined by b′(x) = y(e*) + e*.
More generally, for any positive z, let x*(z) be determined by b′(x) = z, so that x*(z) is the optimal level of activity if the social cost per unit of activity is z.
Under the tax regime, an injurer pays tx in taxes, where t cannot depend on y or e because, as noted in the introduction, the state is assumed not to be able to observe them.
Hence, injurers choose e and x to maximize b(x) -(t + e)x. Thus, they choose e = 0 and x
That is, we have
PROPOSITION 5: Under the tax regime, injurers exercise no precautions, so that expected harm per unit of activity y(0) is excessive. The optimal tax t* = y(0) and the level of activity is x*(y(0)), which is optimal given y(0). Social welfare is W T .
Under liability, injurers choose e and x to maximize b(x) -(py(e) + e)x. Therefore, they choose e to minimize py(e) + e and their choice e L is determined by py′(e) = -1;
hence e* > e L > 0. Accordingly, injurers choose x*(py(e L ) + e L ), which exceeds the Hence, e minimizes pλy(e) + e, so the choice of e, denoted e J , is determined by pλy′(e) = -1. Observe that e* > e J > 0 since y is convex in e. Further, x is x*(t + pλy(e J ) + e J ). It is clear that, for any λ, the optimal t is (1 -pλ)y(e J ), for then x will be x*(y(e J ) + e J ), that is, optimal given e J . Now we can also see that λ should be 1, since if λ < 1 and λ is increased, e J will rise closer to e*, meaning that y(e) + e will fall (because this term is convex in e), implying that welfare b(x) -(y(e) + e)x will rise since x will be optimal given y(e) + e.
Online Appendix
This appendix contains the proof of the part of Proposition 4 that is not shown in the text, namely, under the optimal joint tax and liability regime, the optimal tax t** < E(y) provided that injurer benefits b(x) display decreasing absolute risk aversion.
To establish this claim, observe that under the joint tax and liability regime, social welfare as a function of the tax t is
since it was shown already that λ = 1. Hence
where x*′(t + py) is the derivative of x*(t + py) with respect to t. It will be shown that
As I will note below, an essentially identical argument to what I am about to give will prove also that W TL ′(t) < 0 for any t > E(y). Hence, it will follow that the optimal tax t** must be less than E(y). Observe first that since the optimal tax under a tax only regime is E(y) (from Proposition 1), b(x*(t)) -x*(t)E(y) is maximized at t = E(y). 
Therefore, b′(x*(E(y)))x*′(E(y)) -x*′(E(y))E(y) = 0, which implies that b′(x*(E(y))) -E(y) = 0. This is equivalent to
The first term in (6) is positive, since the integrand is positive for each y < E(y). This claim about (6) is readily seen from Figure 1 . In particular, in region A, an upward movement in the line x*(E(y)) brings x closer to the optimum x*(y) at each y, and given the concavity of welfare b(x) -xy in x, this change in x increases welfare. 5 The second term in (6) is negative, since the integrand is negative for each y > E(y). The explanation is analagous to what was just stated; in regions B and C, an upward movement in the line x*(E(y)) makes x more distant from x*(y) and thus lowers welfare at each y. 
